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IC Infectious Clone 
NIH National Institutes of Health (USA) 
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VIGS Virus Induced Gene Silencing 
WHO World Health Organisation 
Abstract 
Plant virus infectious clones are important tools with wide ranging applications in different 
areas of biology and medicine. Their uses in plant pathology include the study of plant-virus 
interactions, and screening of germplasm as part of pre-breeding programmes for virus 
resistance. They can also be modified to induce transient plant gene silencing (Virus Induced 
Gene Silencing - VIGS) and as expression vectors for plant or exogenous proteins, with 
applications in both plant pathology and more generally for the study of plant gene 
function. Plant viruses are also increasingly being investigated as expression vectors for in 
planta production of pharmaceutical products, known as molecular farming. However, plant 
virus infectious clones may pose a risk to the environment due to their ability to 
reconstitute fully functional, transmissible viruses. These risks arise both from their inherent 
pathogenicity and the effect of any introduced genetic modifications. Effective containment 
measures are therefore required. There has been no single comprehensive review of the 
biosafety considerations for the contained use of genetically modified plant viruses, despite 
their increasing importance across many biological fields. This review therefore explores the 
biosafety considerations for working with genetically modified plant viruses in contained 
environments, with focus on plant growth facilities. It includes regulatory frameworks, risk 
assessment, assignment of biosafety levels, facility features and working practices. The 
review is based on international guidance together with information provided by plant virus 
researchers. 
  
Introduction 
Plant viruses are important not only because of the threat they pose to global crop 
production, but also due to their use as research tools in molecular plant pathology and 
other areas of biotechnology. (Rybicki 2015; Scholthof et al. 2011). Much of this success 
hinges on the ability to maintain, replicate and modify plant viral genomes in the form of 
infectious clones (ICs).  
ICs consist of plant viral genome material maintained as cDNA or DNA templates within 
bacterial plasmids, usually in Escherichia coli, affording ease of in vitro propagation, storage, 
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and genetic manipulation. These plasmids can then be used for in vitro transcription of viral 
RNA for direct inoculation of plants (for RNA viruses), or transformed into Agrobacterium 
tumefaciens for inoculation of plants by agroinfiltration (both RNA and DNA viruses) 
(Dagless et al. 1997, Feng et al. 2017, Peyret and Lomonossoff 2015,            -Nowak et 
al. 2016). This then results in infection and the reconstitution of fully functional self-
replicating virus genomes within the plant host.  
Plant virus ICs have a broad range of applications. Within the field of plant pathology, the 
creation of infectious clones containing wild type viral genomes provides a ready source of 
inoculum for disease resistance screening of different host genotypes. This negates the 
need to maintain and passage the virus within plants and provides an alternative to 
laborious or inefficient inoculation techniques such as grafting or infection by insect vectors. 
ICs also provide a genetically uniform source of inoculum, removing obstacles caused by 
genetically variable viral populations or mutations occurring during plant passage.  
Examples include the use of Cassava mosaic virus ICs to screen transgenic cassava for virus 
resistance, aiding the development of cassava lines with resistance to the devastating 
diseases caused by these viruses (Kuria et al. 2017; Beyene et al. 2016). In addition, 
infectious clones can also be used to study the host response at a molecular level. For 
example, Tomato chlorotic mottle virus infectious clones were used to compare the 
proteomes of resistant and susceptible near isogenic tomato lines following infection 
(Carmo et al. 2017). 
The use of infectious clones allows for modification of the viral genome prior to inoculation, 
with various applications. For example, Martin and Rybicki (2002) identified the 
pathogenicity determinants of a highly pathogenic maize streak virus strain by 
   tem tic ll  ‘ w ppi g out’  ectio   of its genome with those from less pathogenic 
strains, creating chimaeric infectious clones.  Duff-Farrier et al. (2015, 2016) used chimaeric 
infectious clones of Pepino mosaic virus to identify the pathogenicity determinants of 
different virus strains within various plant hosts. Similarly, Harper et al. (2016) identified the 
genetic determinants of Citrus tristeza virus transmissibility by aphids by systematically 
substituting sequences from a highly transmissible strain into a poorly transmissible strain.  
Chimaeric ICs have also been used to study the constraints of plant virus recombination in 
an evolutionary context (Martin et al., 2005). Tagging of plant viral genomes with 
fluorescent reporter genes is also widely used both to track viral movement in planta and to 
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elucidate the function of specific viral proteins. For example, Martinez & Daros, (2014) used 
fluorescent tagging of the Tobacco etch virus P1 protein to track its sub-cellular localization 
and interaction with host proteins.  
In addition to their role in the study of plant-virus interactions, modified plant viruses can 
also be used to trigger silencing of host genes (known as virus induced gene silencing or 
VIGS) without the need for stable plant transgenesis (Lange et al. 2013; Lee et al. 2012). 
VIGS involves modifying infectious clones to contain a short sequence of the host gene of 
interest, resulting in post transcriptional silencing of the gene as part of the plant’  ow  
defence response following virus infection. For example, modified Barley stripe mosaic virus 
is widely used to silence genes in polyploid cereals such as wheat. Beyond silencing plant 
genes, VIGS can also be used to silence the genes of other plant pathogens during co-
infection, further aiding the study of plant-pathogen interactions and exploring gene 
function in pathogens not amenable to modification (reviewed in Lee et al. 2012).  
However, the use of ICs is no longer the preserve of plant molecular biologists and 
pathologists. Modified plant viruses are also increasingly being used in other disciplines as 
expression vectors for heterologous proteins, particularly with biopharmaceutical and 
industrial applications (known as molecular farming). Such applications have been 
extensively reviewed elsewhere (Pogue et al. 2002; Canizares et al. 2005; Gleba et al. 2007; 
N g ová & Šub  2007; Daniell et al. 2009; Hefferon 2012; Hefferon 2014; Saunders & 
Lomonossoff 2013; Marsian & Lomonossoff 2016; Plchova et al. 2017; Steele et al. 2017).  
 
Briefly, plants can be used as living ‘factories’ fo  fo eig  p otei  p oductio    d the e 
systems are less costly than other eukaryotic bioreactors. The use of ICs to transiently 
express the gene of interest in planta is often favoured over stable transgenesis, due to the 
ease and speed with which viral genomes can be modified compared to those of plants, the 
high levels of protein production achieved and the potential for use in a broad range of 
hosts. Such systems show promise for the generation of vaccines, antigens, hormones, 
therapeutic antibodies, industrial biopolymers, and bio-nanoparticles.   
 
There has been no single comprehensive review of the biosafety considerations for the 
contained use of genetically modified plant viruses, despite their increasing importance 
across many biological fields. This review therefore explores the biosafety considerations for 
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working with IC-derived plant viruses in contained environments, with focus on plant 
growth facilities. It includes regulatory frameworks, risk assessment, assignment of 
biosafety levels, facility features and working practices. The review is based on international 
guidance together with information provided by plant virus researchers. 
 
Biosafety and Plant Virus ICs 
Plant virus ICs are powerful tools with applications across multiple scientific fields from 
plant pathology to biopharmaceutical production. However, their use carries potential 
environmental risks and is therefore subject to containment and regulation. Once inside a 
plant cell, the viral genome is translated or released, leading to reconstitution of a fully 
functional virus that is then capable of replication and potentially of spread within the plant 
and transmission to other plants. In addition, while unmodified plant viruses do not pose a 
risk to human health (Nikitin et al. 2016) they could potentially be used as expression 
vectors for genes encoding proteins known to have some degree of human allergenicity or 
toxicity, with potential health implications for researchers and the wider population 
(Wagner et al.,2004, NIH 2013). Despite this, there is no single source of guidance tailored 
specifically toward effective containment of genetically modified plant viruses. The relevant 
information is scattered across numerous documents from multiple countries, and 
therefore not easily accessible to researchers.  In this review we therefore consolidate this 
information to highlight the biosafety considerations for the contained use of plant viruses. 
We also review individual risk assessments and protocols provided by researchers currently 
working with plant virus ICs in Europe and the USA. We focus predominantly on mitigation 
of environmental risks from the use of ICs in plant growth facilities. We also highlight 
complexities in the regulatory and approval process for working with plant virus infectious 
clones, using the UK framework as an example.  
Risk Groups and Biosafety Levels 
The World Health Organisation Laboratory Biosafety Manual (WHO 2004) provides 
international guidance for working with disease-causing and/or genetically modified 
microorganisms. It sets out four risk groups for these microorganisms based on the 
likelihood and impact of release or exposure, ranging from 1 being low to 4 the highest risk. 
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It then sets out four corresponding laboratory biosafety levels (BSLs), each with defined 
requirements for laboratory design and operating procedures (WHO 2004). This guidance 
has been adopted globally and translated into broadly comparable national regulations and 
guidance (Tian & Zheng 2014). 
However, the WHO Laboratory Biosafety Manual is largely focussed on containment of 
pathogens of humans and animals in a laboratory setting, and not the environmental risks 
posed by contained use of genetically modified plants or plant pathogens. There is no 
equivalent international level guidance for plant containment facilities.  
Many countries are signed up to international treaties related to plant biosafety, namely the 
Cartegena Biosafety Protocol (https://bch.cbd.int/protocol) and the International Plant 
Protection Convention (https://www.ippc.int). However, the former is primarily concerned 
with the deliberate release of genetically modified plants, while the latter aims to control 
the spread of plant pests and pathogens already present in nature. Neither currently sets 
out guidance on contained use.  
It has therefore fallen to individual countries to build upon the WHO laboratory guidelines, 
to create guidance applicable to the contained use of plants and plant pathogens (including 
plant virus ICs) within plant growth facilities, with consideration for the environmental risks 
posed. This has resulted in the creation of country-specific but broadly comparable guidance 
for the containment of GM plants and plant pathogens, including the adoption of biosafety 
levels specific to plants.  
Biosafety Levels for Plants 
The USA was the first country to build upon the laboratory biosafety levels set out by WHO 
to set out four biosafety levels for plants (BLPs) as described in the USA National Institutes 
of Health biosafety guidelines (NIH 2013). These are summarised below: 
 BLP1:  Designed for containment of experiments that pose no recognizable or 
predictable risk to the environment in the event of accidental release.  
 BLP2: Appropriate for experiments where there is a possibility of survival and 
dissemination of plant-related material in the event of accidental release, but where 
this would have a minimal biological impact.  
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 BLP3: Designed to minimise or prevent spread or release of organisms that have the 
potential for significant environmental harm. It is also appropriate for containment 
of plants or associated microbes producing vertebrate toxins.  
 BLP4: The highest containment level, may be required for containment of certain 
exotic plant pathogens, including viruses in the presence of their arthropod vector.  
The NIH (USA) also describe biological containment methods (such as removal of flowering 
plant parts) which can be used to reduce the biosafety level requirement in some instances. 
Fu the  ex mple  of biologic l co t i me t of pl  t vi u  IC    e de c ibed u de  ‘Biologic l 
Co t i me t’ l te  i  thi   eview. The NIH guideli e    e exp  ded upo  i  ‘A p  ctic l 
guide to containment: Plant biosafety in re e  ch g ee hou e ’ (Adair & Irwin 2008). The 
first edition of this manual (Traynor et al. 2001) along with the NIH guidelines have been 
used as a reference point for several other countries when developing their own guidance 
or legislation for plant containment (Department of Agriculture (South Africa), 2004; UNCST, 
2007; Adair and Irwin 2008; Kenya, 2009; Tanzania, 2012; Office of The Gene Technology 
Regulator (Australia), 2012). This has resulted in broadly comparable guidelines and plant 
biosafety level designations across the globe, with countries such as South Africa adopting 
the USA BLP designations ad verbum (Department of Agriculture (DAFF) (South Africa), 
2004).  
An equivalent framework of plant biosafety levels has also been adopted across the 
European Union, enacted in EU directive 2009/41/EC. As such, the Health and Safety 
Executive in the UK also sets out four biosafety levels (BSLs) for plant growth facilities (HSE 
2004). However, unlike the NIH, the UK HSE does not state the purpose of each BSL in 
summary form. Rather, assignment of the BSL for an activity involving plant-associated 
genetically modified microorganisms (GMMs) is based on a detailed risk assessment (see 
‘Ri   A  e  me t’ below).  
BSL4 is not represented in the UK guidance as no such plant growth facility currently exists 
in the UK. BSL1 i  o l   uit ble fo   ctivitie  with ‘ o o   egligible  i  ’, therefore in planta 
work involving plant virus ICs is likely to be carried out at BSL2 or BSL3. The building, 
equipment, and operational requirements for these BSLs are summarised in Table 1, with 
differences in requirements between BSLs highlighted. The key differences between BSL2 
and BSL3 are the requirement for negative pressure and air filtering, sealed flooring, and 
waste treatment within the facility at BSL3.  
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Some countries such as Canada have slightly different minimum requirements and 
numbering systems for each biosafety level; Canadian Plant Pest Containment (PPC) levels 
1-3 roughly correspond to UK-BSL/USA-BLP2-4 (Canadian Food Inspection Agency 2014).  
Risk assessment  
A risk assessment is necessary for activities involving pathogenic microorganisms, including 
plant viruses. The aim of the assessment is to identify and define risks posed to the 
environment and to human health, and identify control measures required to mitigate these 
risks. Some national competent authorities provide step-by-step guidance on performing 
risk assessments for working with plant-associated GMMs. For example, in the UK the HSE 
require the use of a risk determination matrix, which considers the likelihood of release 
against the consequences should a release occur (Table 2). The risk is considered high when 
there is a high likelihood of release along with severe consequences in the event of a 
release. Conversely, if both the likelihood and consequences of a release are negligible then 
the risk can be considered as effectively zero (HSE 2004). Containment measures must be 
selected that reduce the overall risk to low or effectively zero. Other countries such as 
Canada also use risk determination matrices to inform decisions regarding the biosafety 
measures required. C   d ’  m t ix i  b  ed o  the  i   of e c pe   d e t bli hme t i  the 
absence of physical containment, and assigns a required biosafety level accordingly. 
However, the physical attributes of the facility must be adequate for containment 
regardless of risk posed (Canadian Food Inspection Agency 2014).   
A risk assessment needs to consider many factors, such as whether the virus is indigenous, 
its host range, effects of genetic modification, the presence of hosts or vectors, and 
interactions with other organisms within or around the containment facility. In addition to 
the nature of the virus, the nature of the activity should also be considered, such as 
experiment duration and scale (HSE 2004; Department of Agriculture (South Africa), 2004; 
Adair & Irwin, 2008; Canadian Food Inspection Agency 2014). The following sections 
highlight key considerations for plant virus risk assessments: 
Effects of genetic modification 
In the case of genetically modified plant virus ICs, the risk assessment needs to consider not 
only the inherent risks of the virus but also how the risks might be altered by its 
modification (Department of Agriculture (South Africa) 2004; Phillipson & Weekes 2005; HSE 
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2004). For example, an otherwise low risk virus modified to express a fungal virulence 
factor, may pose and environmental risk by making infected plants more susceptible to 
fungal pathogens. Similarly, a virus carrying a construct to silence a trait involved in crop 
yield would present a higher risk to nearby host crops than the unmodified virus (Lee et al. 
2012). Genetic modifications may also impact the host range, survival and transmission of 
the virus, or result in loss of host resistance. For example, introduction of a coat protein 
mutation in Pepino mosaic virus breaks Rx-mediated resistance in solanaceous hosts (Duff-
Farrier et al. 2016) and so would be a higher risk than ICs that were not able to overcome 
such host resistance. 
Interactions with other organisms 
There may be additional risks posed by other organisms contained in close proximity to the 
plant virus or indeed be part of the same experimental system (Adair & Irwin, 2008). These 
include GM or exotic plants, insect vectors, and other infectious agents such as 
Agrobacterium tumefaciens that may have been used to introduce the viral genome into the 
host plant. Consideration should be given not only to the inherent risks of these organisms 
but also to the potential interaction between them and the infectious clone, aiding 
dissemination and transmission. Plant growth facilities are often used by multiple 
researchers for various projects, which may have different containment requirements, and 
operational practices need to reflect this.  
Establishment in the environment 
Risks of establishment and survival of a plant virus depend not only on the virus and any 
modifications, but also on the immediate environment. Viruses are unlikely to persist in an 
environment where their host and/or vector are absent. The risk may also be considered 
lower in countries where the plant host is present but not economically important or widely 
cultivated. Therefore, ICs that pose a prohibitively high risk in one country or region may be 
used with relatively low risk in another. However, the possibility of unknown hosts or 
vectors that would allow survival and establishment should always be carefully considered, 
as should the ability of the virus to adapt to infect new hosts or vectors. 
Consideration of socioeconomic factors  
When assessing the impact of virus escape and establishment, it is important not only to 
consider the impact on host plants, such as crops, but also the capacity of a country to 
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identify, respond to and mitigate a containment breach. In the case of crops, the potential 
downstream impact on farmer livelihood must be estimated. More economically developed 
countries with greater food security might be less impacted by a disease outbreak than less 
economically developed countries with a small number of staple subsistence crops, diseases 
of which could result in loss of livelihood and even famine (Thresh 2003). These countries 
may also be less well equipped to contain disease spread, exacerbated by mixed cropping 
systems and year-round availability of hosts. 
Derogations from BSL requirements 
It is important to identify the most appropriate measures for virus containment on a case by 
case basis and then assign the minimum Biosafety Level (BSL) that ensures these measures 
are implemented, rather than simply applying generic containment measures based on BSL, 
which may not be appropriate for containment (HSE-UK 2004). The risk assessment may 
therefore identify extra containment measures which are not specified for a given BSL, but 
also cases where some features of the designated BSL are not appropriate or beneficial for 
containment. This may be because they are superfluous to requirements, or indeed because 
they actively impede containment measures. In this situation, the researchers may apply for 
derogations from the BSL. A common derogation is the lack of microbiological safety 
cabinets at BSL3, as these are inappropriate for in planta work. Other examples may be 
specific to plant virus work; for example the negative pressure gradient normally required at 
BSL3 could promote the ingress of insect vectors which could spread the virus throughout 
the facility. HEPA filters, for example, are required at BSL3, however the use of a G4 filter 
may be more appropriate for containing pollen-borne viruses (Adair & Irwin, 2008).  
Common shortcomings of risk assessments for genetically modified plant viruses 
Research commissioned by HSE (UK) into the containment of genetically modified plant 
viruses has identified several common shortcomings and inconsistencies in the risk 
assessment process (Phillipson & Weekes 2005). The UK Scientific Advisory Committee on 
Genetic Modification (SACGM) compendium of guidance also provides an example risk 
assessment for working with GM plant viruses, highlighting some of the details that 
researchers may fail to include when performing a risk assessment (HSE 2004). Common 
shortcomings include the reliance on expert opinion rather than empirical data, as well as 
specific risk factors being described qualitatively rather than quantitatively. This is 
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particularly true of the assessment of risks related to the stability of genetic modifications, 
the presence of hosts and/or vectors, and the potential for spread of mechanically 
transmitted viruses as outlined below: 
Stability of genetic modification  
Researchers often state that, should a modified plant virus IC be released, the nature of 
virus replication means that the genetic insertion is likely to be lost after a number of 
rounds of replication, rendering the virus equivalent to wild type, as observed for the 
frequently used TMV expression system (Donson et al., 1991, Kohl et al 2006, Rabindran & 
Dawson 2001, Varsani et al. 2006).  This argument is used to qualify the low risks posed by 
multiple species of genetically modified indigenous viruses. However, the likelihood of the 
insert persisting will depend on the virus in question and the size and nature of the insert, 
and so should be quantified on a case by case basis (Hefferon 2014, Phillipson & Weekes 
2005). 
Conversely, and particularly in the case of molecular farming, researchers use genetic 
modific tio  to ‘di  ble’ vi u e  c    i g exogenous proteins, for example by removing 
genes required for dissemination or transmission (Gleba et al. 2007, Hefferon 2014). Their 
evaluation of risk relies on the assumption that this modification is stable and would persist 
should the infectious clone be released into the environment, without acknowledging that 
the virus could be rendered fully infective via viral recombination, whilst maintaining the 
genes for exogenous protein production (Phillipson & Weekes 2005). 
Identification of hosts and vectors 
The absence of native hosts or vectors in the environment surrounding the containment 
facility is often used as a basis for low risk, especially in the case of non-indigenous viruses. 
However, lack of evidence of a known vector in the region where work is to be done using a 
non-indigenous virus does not mean that no vector exists. This also applies to host range, as 
there may be unidentified hosts present in the local environment. Where possible 
preliminary transmission studies should be done to ascertain risk of transmission by native 
insect pests and/or to native plant hosts (for examples see Phillipson and Weekes 2005).  
Mechanical transmission 
Mechanically transmitted viruses may be inadvertently spread throughout a containment 
facility by physical contact between plants, or contact between plants and contaminated 
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equipment such as watering cans or gloves. Equivalent risk of accidental spread between 
plants is often apportioned to multiple species of mechanically transferred viruses, without 
quantification of the rates of transfer. However, Phillipson and Weekes (2005) found 
significantly different rates of mechanical transmission between two commonly used plant 
viruses; Tobacco mosaic virus and Potato Virus X. It cannot be assumed that all mechanically 
transmitted viruses have an equivalent risk of accidental spread. 
It is therefore important that where possible, risk assessments are based on established 
evidence, and that a precautionary approach is adopted where there is an element of 
uncertainty. 
Dual use and deliberate release 
In addition to the risks posed by unintentional release of a plant virus from a containment 
facility, it is also important to consider the potential for deliberate release or malicious use 
of plant virus infectious clones, known as dual use risk. While biological warfare is generally 
associated with human disease agents such as anthrax, there is the potential for 
bioterrorism using plant pathogens, which could have devastating effects on food security. 
It has been proposed that targeting crops may be simpler and less technologically 
challenging than biological warfare against humans (Wheelis et al. 2002; Madden & Van Den 
Bosch 2002; Whitby 2001). The USA Centers for Disease Control (CDC) maintain a list of 
‘ elect  ge t ’ that are considered a bioterrorism risk and require additional containment 
and regulation. This list includes some plant pathogens but does not currently include any 
plant viruses. However, there is concern that molecular farming using modified plant viruses 
has the potential for dual use due to the ability to produce large quantities of human toxins 
in planta (Federation of American Scientists 2011). In the USA there is a statutory 
requirement to declare research with a dual use risk but this requires that the risk has been 
identified; plant researchers may not consider that their research outcome could have a 
dual use. It is therefore important to consider the possibility of dual use during a risk 
assessment, to liaise with the appropriate competent authorities and to instigate 
proportionate containment and security measures to guard against misappropriation.  
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Containment methods for GM plant viruses 
As part of this review we contacted 35 research groups in 18 countries working with 
infectious clones of plant viruses, requesting risk assessments, standard operating 
procedures and details of any permits or licenses required by their competent authorities to 
work with ICs.  
Most respondents were UK or USA based and designated their plant virus IC work as 
requiring BSL2, and therefore subject to the requirements laid out in Table 1. However, 
specific containment measures are based on the risk assessment and depend on the nature 
of the plant virus and the way in which it is being used. The following section therefore 
details aspects of facility design, equipment and operating procedures specifically tailored 
to containment of plant virus infectious clones. Examples are drawn from the published 
literature and information provided by scientists working with plant virus ICs. Since many 
plant viruses have arthropod vectors, strategies are needed not only for containment of 
infected plant material but also any vectors (Hogenhout et al. 2008). More generic guidance 
on commissioning and building plant quarantine facilities and developing standard 
operating procedures is available from national competent authorities such as the HSE (UK), 
the NIH (USA), the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and Adair & Irwin (2008). 
Biological Containment Methods 
Biological containment involves taking steps to render contained organisms biologically 
incapacitated, and in the context of plant virus infectious clones this can be achieved in a 
variety of ways and at a number of stages in the IC construction, modification and 
inoculation process. 
In most cases, plant virus genomes are maintained and propagated in the laboratory within 
disarmed Escherichia coli strains such as DH5α, which are not pathogenic to humans, 
animals or plants. In addition, eukaryotic promoters are used to reduce the likelihood of the 
viral genome being transcribed within the prokaryotic bacterial host. This means that 
minimal physical and chemical containment methods are then required for these bacterial 
cultures. Similarly, thought should be given to the temporal order of plasmid construction, 
for example adding the promoter sequence last to delay the point in the development 
pipeline at which the clone becomes infectious. 
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The plasmid containing the viral genome is then often transformed into disarmed strains of 
A. tumefaciens such as C58C1 (pMP90) from which the tumour inducing genes have been 
removed (Wagner et al. 2004). However, these strains of A. tumefaciens are infectious to 
plants, and when containing plasmids with genetically modified viral genome sequences, 
they must be handled accordingly.  
When using plant virus ICs as expression vectors, as is the case for molecular farming, the 
viral genome itself may be modified to be less virulent or transmissible (HSE 2004; Plchova 
et al. 2017). The e   e m    ex mple  of  o c lled ‘deco  t ucted vecto ’    tem , i  which 
a part of the viral genome required for systemic spread is removed and delegated instead to 
a transgenic host plant (Gleba et al. 2007).  For example, deletion of the Potato virus X 
movement protein prevents systemic spread of PVX except in transgenic plants expressing 
the movement protein (Manske & Schiemann 2005). 
This approach is less useful for studying the nature of plant viruses and their interaction 
with their hosts, or for germplasm screening, where fully infectious clones are desirable as a 
source of viral inoculum rather than as a biotechnology tool. For viruses with segmented 
genomes, some degree of biological containment prior to inoculation may still be achieved 
by maintaining different parts of the viral genome within different cDNA clones. The host 
plant then needs to be co-inoculated with different clones to enable complete infectious 
virus particles to be created, as demonstrated for the tripartite Barley stripe mosaic virus 
(BSMV) genome (Lee et al. 2012). Separating viral genome components in this way reduces 
the risk of accidentally releasing the entire viral genome prior to inoculation, but does not 
reduce the risk posed by the full virus once reconstructed in planta.  
Biological containment may also be used to prevent or limit the transmission of IC-derived 
plant viruses by insect or arthropod vectors. For example, the viral genome may be modified 
to remove the genes required for transmission, as shown for Tobacco rattle tobravirus 
transmission by nematode vectors (Hernandez et al. 1997). However, this requires 
knowledge of the genetic components required for vector transmission, which is lacking for 
most plant viruses. In addition, limiting vector transmission in this way precludes the study 
of vector transmission itself.  
In practice a more broadly applicable biological method of preventing vector transmission is 
to conduct experiments, particularly those using vectors, at a time of year when they would 
not be able to establish outside of the containment facility. Similarly, experiments can be 
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conducted at a time of year when the host plant is not being widely grown. Another 
approach used for pollen and seed transmitted viruses is to prevent flowering or remove 
flowering plant parts to prevent pollen and seed transmission (Department of Agriculture 
(South Africa, 2004; Adair and Irwin, 2008).   
Facility design 
Many of the facility considerations for containment of plant viruses are addressed by 
generic guidance for plant quarantine buildings (see Adair & Irwin, 2008), and subject to the 
requirements for the designated biosafety level as summarised in Table 1 However, some 
aspects of facility design are particularly relevant to plant virus containment, as laid out 
below and in Figure 1. Note that requirements for each aspect of facility design are 
dependent on risk assessment; not all facility design measures will be required for every IC 
use.  
Location and surroundings 
Geographical isolation from potential hosts is a useful tool for the containment of many 
plants and plant associated microorganisms. In the case of GM crop plants, pollen dispersal 
distances are often used in risk assessments, particularly for confined field trials where 
there is limited physical containment. Risk of introgression can be considered low when 
there are no crops or cross-pollinating wild relatives within the dispersal distance.  
Pollen dispersal distances may also be useful for assessing the risk of escape and 
establishment of pollen transmitted viruses, and setting physical, biological and/or chemical 
containment requirements accordingly. The same applies to identifying the maximum travel 
distances of insect vectors in the case of vector-transmitted viruses. In some cases it may be 
permissible to relax physical and other containment measures due to geographical isolation. 
Laying out the ground immediately surrounding the facility with concrete allows rapid 
identification and removal of any germinating plants that could act as hosts for contained 
viruses or virus vectors. This measure may also be useful in the case of seed transmitted 
viruses when the research has involved collection of virus infected seed which could 
germinate and disemminate the virus if released. However, it should be noted that the 
primary route of seed escape would be on re e  che  ’ clothi g   d th t  eeds might not be 
shed immediately. 
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Entrances, Exits and Vestibules 
Air lock entrances with interlocking doors are useful not only for controlling access to the 
facility via key cards, but also serve as an additional control for highly mobile insect vectors. 
The vestibule at the entrance to a growth room can be enhanced to prevent vector entry or 
escape by the use of high temperatures, or controlled lighting so that the vestibule is always 
darker than the containment room thus discouraging insect egress due to light attraction. 
Additionally, air lock compartments with powerful air showers can be used to ensure the 
removal of any insects from clothing and equipment at entry and exit. The United States 
Department of Agriculture Animal and Plant Inspectorate Service (USDA-APHIS) recommend 
full wet showers on exit when working with quarantine insect vectors (USDA-APHIS 2010). 
Air Handling 
Many plant growth facilities rely on air conditioning and air circulation systems to maintain 
appropriate temperature, humidity and CO2 levels. Depending on the nature of the virus and 
the work conducted, suitable filters may be required to trap any potentially infected 
particulate matter, such as pollen, petals and insects. While HEPA filters are a requirement 
at BSL3, Phillipson and Weekes (2005) observe that they are unlikely to be necessary for 
most plant virus work. However, this does not consider the requirements of multi-purpose 
facilities housing various quarantine organisms with diverse containment requirements.  
USDA-APHIS (2010) suggests the use of 80 mesh for working with plant viruses and their 
vectors. They also suggest directional airflow with movement from the least to most 
hazardous rooms within a facility.  
As previously mentioned, maintenance of negative air pressure compared to the 
surrounding environment may be unnecessary or even detrimental to the containment of 
plant viruses and their vectors. However, it may be required for other organisms within the 
facility. In this case influx air should be filtered to prevent the ingress of insect vectors due 
to negative pressure. Air treatment systems should also be designed to accommodate 
access for repair and routine maintenance without compromising containment.  
Equipment 
Autoclaves 
Autoclaves for inactivation of solid waste are required within the building at BSL2, and 
within the facility at BSL3. At the two BSL3 plant virus containment facilities we surveyed 
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(UK and Poland), double doo ed ‘th ough the w ll’  utocl ve    e i  t lled to p eve t 
material becoming contaminated after autoclaving but before removal from the facility, 
exceeding general requirements for this BSL.  
As with all decontamination measures it is important to validate the effectiveness of 
autoclave run settings (i.e. temperature and run duration) for inactivation of viruses. 
Temperature indicator strips and electronic monitoring should be used to confirm the 
correct function of autoclaves. 
Waste water treatment  
Depending on the risk assessment, it may be necessary to collect and treat some or all 
waste water in a facility, such as run off from plant watering, washing up basins, hand-wash 
sinks and showers. Purpose built waste water treatment units may be used combining 
chemical, thermal and UV treatment. However, in some cases dilution alone may serve to 
render plant viruses non-infectious. For example, >1/512 dilution of Barley stripe mosaic 
virus inoculum abolishes infectivity of this virus (Urban et al. 2011). Screens or filter socks 
over drains may be used to collect solid material such as plant waste from run off water, 
which can then be autoclaved (Adair & Irwin, 2008). Since many facilities house multiple 
organisms requiring containment, treatment of common aspects such as water must be 
validated for all contained organisms, not just viruses (Urban et al. 2011). 
Data collection equipment 
Removal of potentially contaminated data collection equipment from containment facilities 
poses a significant risk of accidental release of plant viruses. The installation of networked 
computers with associated hardware such as scanners, printers and memory card readers 
within the facility negates the need to remove laboratory notebooks and cameras, as data 
can be uploaded to shared drives from within the facility. 
 
Other facility considerations 
It is advisable to use a Class II laminar flow biosafety cabinet for opening packages received 
from elsewhere, as imported plant material may house other pathogens besides the desired 
virus strain (USDA-APHIS 2010). As with any containment facility there should be an alarm 
system to detect the failure of critical systems such as loss of negative pressure, as well as 
alarmed emergency exits. Facilities and equipment should be regularly checked and 
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routinely serviced. Where downstream analysis of infected plant tissue is required, such as 
molecular characterisation or microscopy, there should be provisions for this within the 
containment facility or in another facility running at the same BSL, with transfer in sealed 
non-breakable containers. If this is not possible material should be inactivated before 
removal from the facility, for example by harvesting into biocidal lysis buffer. 
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) 
Containment of plant viruses relies not only on adequate facilities but also strict adherence 
to standard operating procedures (SOPs) for facility operations and experiments, designed 
to ensure both personnel safety and effective containment. As with facilities and 
equipment, these should be based on a risk assessment and tailored to the work being 
done, avoiding unnecessary blanket measures and ensuring that all requirements are 
achievable.  
Personal Protective Wear 
Personal protective wear refers to garments worn by researchers and facilities staff to 
protect them from biological or chemical hazards. However, in the case of plant virus 
containment, such items also reduce the risk of infectious material leaving the facility on 
clothing, skin or hair. 
Microbiological lab coats are required as standard in plant containment facilities, and should 
ideally be kept within the facility and decontaminated prior to removal, or else transported 
within sealed containers, as contaminated lab coats are an obvious source of accidental 
virus release. For facilities housing growth rooms running at different BSLs it is advisable to 
have different coloured lab coats associated with each level. Additional lab coats or 
disposable boiler suits should be provided to engineers, depending on the nature of work to 
be done.  
Gloves are required at BSL3 and are subject to risk assessment for BSL2. While gloves may 
aid in preventing virus spread, it is important to consider when they should be changed or 
removed to prevent contamination of communal surfaces, such as door handles and 
computer keyboards. This is particularly relevant to mechanically transmitted viruses which 
could be transferred to non-infected plants via contaminated surfaces. 
As previously described, prevention of flowering or removal of flowering plants is often used 
as a biological containment measure. However, where experiments require flowering plants 
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infected with viruses transmitted via pollen, and risk assessment dictates that this must be 
contained, hairnets may be worn to reduce the risk of pollen spread. These are removed 
and disposed of prior to exiting the containment facility. 
While many plant containment facilities use chemical foot baths to decontaminate shoes on 
exit, an alternative is to use disposable overshoes.  
Waste and equipment decontamination 
The most common means of inactivating biological material is by autoclaving (see previous 
 ectio  u de  ‘Equipme t’). However, if waste or equipment needs to be transported within 
or between facilities prior to autoclaving, additional steps should be taken to inactivate or 
contain it. For example glassware may be soaked in disinfectant prior to removal for 
autoclaving. Any such protocol must be validated for successful inactivation of the target 
vi u ,   the  th    impl  followi g ge e ic p otocol  o  m  uf ctu e  ’ i  t uctio  . 
Chemical decontamination methods should be validated for equipment that cannot be 
autoclaved, such as plastic plant pots and trays. These methods may need to be effective 
both  g i  t vi u e    d  g i  t i  ect vecto   ( ee ‘Vecto  Co t ol’ below). If thi  c   ot be 
achieved it may be advisable to use single use equipment.  
Limits are routinely set on maximum viral inoculum volumes (e.g. <100ml) to ensure 
effective disinfection of liquid waste and containment of spills, and to reduce the likelihood 
of infective doses being present in waste water, negating the need for waste water 
treatment.   
As previously outlined u de  ‘Equipme t’, decontamination of run-off water is dependent 
on risk assessment and not always required. In facilities without sealed floors (i.e. BSL2 
glasshouses) run off should be minimised, and the ground treated periodically to inactivate 
virus particles.  
Surface Sterilisation 
As with waste disposal, surface sterilisation products and methods and should be validated 
for activity against the target organism, for example by swabbing benches after sterilisation 
and inoculating test plants. Protocols for hand washing also need to be appropriate for the 
viral system being used rather than simply the BSL. For example, quarantine procedures for 
TMV at Purdue University (USA)  pecif  the u e of cow ’ mil  to w  h h  d  i , p  ticul  l  
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for smokers, to inactivate TMV and prevent mechanical transmission. They note that 70% 
ethanol is not effective (Adair & Irwin 2008). 
In addition, care should be taken to ensure that equipment used throughout a facility, such 
as watering cans, do not become contaminated, as this could result in accidental transfer of 
mechanically transmitted viruses between plants during watering. Any such equipment that 
comes into contact with infected plant material should be decontaminated prior to further 
use.   
Vector control  
Control of disease vectors within research facilities is a general requirement laid out by 
regulators in many countries including the UK and USA. This is particularly pertinent to 
containment of plant viruses with known or potential native insect vectors. However, such 
control may be achieved in several different ways.  
Many facilities opt for routine and reactive chemical treatments, monitoring for the 
presence of insect vectors by using yellow sticky traps. Good housekeeping and removal of 
discarded plants and dead leaves is also recommended. Where insects are already present, 
Adair & Irwin (2008) suggest ‘b  i g out’ growth rooms at 40C for 2-3 days between 
experiments to kill insects, but advise consideration of whether this will damage equipment. 
This is also not appropriate for facilities with continuously running experiments.  
Alternatively, freezing compost for 48h at -20C prior to use has been found to be effective 
for excluding arthropod pests from the facility when used in combination with airlock entry 
and exits, heat trap vestibules and air showers. 
The protocols of many BSL2+ facilities also preclude the movement of plants between 
facilities and the quarantining of any plants coming in from facilities running at a lower BSL. 
This is because contaminated plants may introduce both insect vectors and wild type viruses 
along with other pathogens that could confound study results. Similarly, where seed-borne 
viruses are of concern, the movement of seed may be controlled and only confirmed virus 
free seed used. 
Finally, restrictions on personnel movement can help to prevent introduction of vectors. For 
example, some SOPs state that researchers should not enter plant containment facilities 
after visiting insectaries or field sites, or participating in recreational activities outdoors.  
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Monitoring and training 
High specification containment facilities and stringent operating procedures mean nothing 
in the absence of staff compliance. Staff therefore need to be adequately trained in all 
relevant protocols, and understand the rationale behind them. The principal investigator or 
facilities manager should oversee and assess training and monitor compliance. Many 
institutes review and update their SOPs annually, and all staff should be involved in this 
process and kept abreast of any changes.  
Regulation of research involving plant virus ICs 
In many countries, plant virus ICs and other plant pathogens require regulation both as 
genetically modified organisms and as disease causing agents, with approval for their use 
granted by at least one national competent authority and subject to multiple laws regarding 
both human health and the environment. Contained use activities may also be regulated at 
both the national and local level. Researchers must therefore ensure that their activities 
conform to all relevant regulations, and that approval has been sought from all competent 
authorities. Here we illustrate the complexity of the regulatory and approval process faced 
by plant virus researchers, focusing on the UK framework with comparisons made to other 
countries.  
 
Laws governing contained use of plant virus ICs 
In the UK, the Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations (HSE 2014) set 
out the requirement for containment measures when working with genetically modified 
microorganisms (GMMs) in order to limit risks to both human health and the environment. 
In addition, the Environmental Protection Act (EPA 1990) sets out the requirement for 
 pp op i te me  u e  to “ void d m ge to the e vi o me t th t m     i e f om e c pe o  
 ele  e f om hum   co t ol” of GMMs. The UK regulatory framework for the contained use 
of plant virus ICs as GMMs is therefore guided by these two pieces of legislation.  
 
Competent authorities overseeing plant virus research 
Contained use of GM plant viruses in the UK is overseen by the Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) working with the Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) in 
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England and Wales, and Science and Advice for Scottish Agriculture (SASA) in Scotland, with 
equivalent legislation and oversight in Northern Ireland by the Health and Safety Executive 
Northern Ireland (HSE-NI) and the Department for Agriculture, Environment and Rural 
Affairs (DAERA).  
There is a requirement to notify HSE (UK) of all intended contained uses of GMMs. Two 
separate notifications are required; firstly of the premises to be used (for all BSLs) and 
secondly of individual contained uses (BSL2-4). Contained use at BSL3/4 requires consent 
from the competent authority, rather than simply notification.  
Regulation of plant pathogens 
In addition to being GMMs, plant virus ICs may also be subject to additional regulation as 
plant pathogens. Many countries set and enforce prohibitions on the import, movement 
and keeping of certain plants and plant pathogens. Such prohibitions generally apply to non-
indigenous strains, those subject to an eradication campaign, or those that exhibit increased 
risks to plant health due to increased pathogenicity, host range or survival. In the UK, 
researchers must apply to APHA (an agency of Defra) for a license to work with prohibited 
plant viruses, in addition to the previously outlined GM notification to HSE. Detailed 
descriptions of containment procedures and facilities are required as part of the license 
application, and effective containment and destruction of the prohibited virus is a condition 
of license approval. Equivalent systems exist in other countries including the USA, Australia 
and Canada, where prohibited pathogens require a permit for contained use and are 
therefore refe  ed to    ‘pe mitted p thoge  ’ (Australian Government, 2017; CFIA, 2015; 
USDA-APHIS, 2016). In all cases provision of a license or permit requires inspection and 
approval of the research establishment by a local and/or national competent authority, 
which may be distinct from the competent authority overseeing approval for GM work. For 
example, in Australia, import of plant pests requires approval by the Department of 
Agriculture and Water Resources, while accreditation of facilities conducting research with 
GMOs falls to the Office of the Gene Technology Regulator (http://www.ogtr.gov.au/).  
Barriers to meeting plant virus containment requirements 
While the guidance set out within this review is theoretically achievable, in some cases 
barriers to containment of plant virus infectious clones remain.  
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For example, specifications for facility design assume the reliable supply of utilities such as 
electricity and water to ensure continuous operation of control systems, supplemental 
lighting and air conditioning. Such provisions are taken for granted in many countries but 
may be harder to achieve in countries or regions where utility supplies are unreliable.   
Expertise in specific viruses may be primarily in institutes where the host plant is widely 
researched and grown extensively, thus presenting an increased risk of virus spread within 
and between growth facilities. Geographical isolation may also not be feasible due to the 
presence of field trials and commercial plantings in proximity to the containment facility. 
This is less of an issue for unmodified endemic virus clones, but may increase the risk posed 
by modifications that alter virus pathogenicity or transmission, or research into exotic 
viruses of native crops. Biological control methods such as conducting experiments at a time 
of year when the host and/or vector is absent from the environment along with stringent 
physical and chemical containment measures may therefore be required.  
Barriers to capacity and location may be overcome by international collaborations that 
facilitate the use of plant virus infectious clones in counties or areas where the plant host 
and vector are absent. Such examples include the use of infectious clones of Cassava mosaic 
virus in the USA to screen cassava germplasm for resistance prior to conducting field trials in 
East Africa (Beyene et al. 2016; Kuria et al. 2017). This virus is a major threat to cassava 
production in Sub-Saharan Africa but poses little appreciable risk in the USA where cassava 
is not cultivated. However, the possibility of host species jumps or unidentified insect 
vectors should always be considered and appropriate containment measures applied.  
The main barrier to successful containment is arguably that posed by human error or failure 
to comply with SOPs, as demonstrated by containment breaches involving human 
pathogens (Weiss et al. 2015; Sample 2014). Diligent oversight of staff training, competence 
and compliance is therefore key to successful plant virus containment. It is also important 
that all staff understand the rationale for containment measures and the risks associated 
with a failure in plant virus containment.  
Conclusion 
Plant virus ICs are important molecular tools in many areas of biology. However, their status 
as both GMMs and plant pathogens necessitates their containment by a combination of 
biological, physical and operational measures to prevent harm to the environment and allay 
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concerns regarding perceived or potential risks to human health. This review is the first to 
bring together biosafety and regulatory considerations from multiple international sources 
for working with plant viruses, and is therefore a valuable resource for all researchers 
developing projects involving the use of plant viruses in a range of biotechnology fields. 
The appropriate containment strategies for plant virus ICs should be decided based on case 
by case assessment of the risks posed and the measures needed to mitigate them, rather 
than assuming that generic containment measures informed by a given BSL will be 
sufficient. Similarly, all containment methods required should be validated for the IC and 
operational system in question, rather than assuming their efficacy. Adequate staff training 
and monitoring of compliance is also essential for effective containment.  
Further research on the persistence of inserted DNA constructs along with the relative 
fitness of modified clones compared to wild type viruses would be helpful in aiding the risk 
assessment process and ensuring that appropriate containment measures are in place. This 
may vary depending on the virus or modification in question and would require research on 
a case by case basis.  
The notification or approval process for use of plant virus ICs may require two or more 
applications to various competent authorities to comply with separate regulations 
governing the use of firstly, GMMs and secondly, plant pathogens, in addition to being 
regulated at both local and national/state level. A more streamlined regulatory framework 
that addresses this dual nature of plant virus ICs and other plant pathogens may save 
duplication during the application process, both in the UK and elsewhere.  
The generation and use of plant virus infectious clones is no longer the preserve of the plant 
molecular biologist, having rapidly gained traction in other fields, particularly biomedicine. It 
is therefore increasingly important that the growing body of researchers using these 
valuable tools are aware of the potential risks they pose and how to mitigate against them. 
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Table 1. Requirements for plant growth facilities operating at Biosafety (Containment) levels 2 and 3,. Y – Required. N – 
Not required. Y/N – required where and to the extent that the risk assessment shows it is required. Differences between 
containment levels 2 and 3 are highlighted in yellow. Modified from the UK SACGM Compendium of Guidance Part 4 (HSE 
2004) 
Containment measures Containment Level 2 Containment level 3 
Building 
Permanent structure 
 
Y Y 
Laboratory suite: isolation 
 
N Y 
Laboratory: sealable for fumigation N Y 
Equipment 
Impervious, easy to clean surfaces 
 
Y-  bench Y - bench and floor 
Entry via an airlock or a separate 
room with two interlocking doors 
 
Y/N Y/N 
Negative pressure relative to 
immediate surroundings 
 
Y/N Y 
HEPA filtered extract air 
 
N Y 
Microbiological safety 
cabinet/enclosure 
 
Y/N 
 
Y 
Autoclave 
 
Y - in building Y - in laboratory suite 
Control of contaminated run-off 
water 
Y - to minimise run-off Y-  to prevent run-off 
System of Work 
Restricted Access 
 
Y Y 
Specific measures to control 
aerosol dissemination 
 
Y - to minimise Y - to prevent 
Shower 
 
N Y/N 
Protective clothing Y Y 
 
Protective footwear 
 
N Y/N 
Gloves Y/N 
 
Y 
Effective control of disease vectors 
which could disseminate the GMM 
 
Y Y 
Effective control of plant material 
which could disseminate the GMM 
 
Y - to minimise dissemination Y - to prevent dissemination 
Procedures for transfer of living 
material between facilities shall 
Y - to minimise dissemination Y - to prevent dissemination 
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control dissemination of GMMs 
 
Specified disinfection procedures  
 
Y Y 
Waste 
Inactivation of GMMs in effluent 
from handwashing sinks and 
showers and similar effluents 
 
N Y/N 
Inactivation of GMMs in 
contaminated materials and waste 
Y - by validated means Y - by validated means, with 
waste inactivated in the 
laboratory suite 
 
Laboratory to contain its own 
equipment 
N Y -  so far as is reasonably 
practicable 
 
An observation window or 
alternative is to be present so that 
occupants can be seen 
Y/N 
 
Y 
Safe storage of GMMs Y 
 
Y 
Written records of staff training Y/N Y 
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Table 2. Risk determination matrix for assessing the level of risk posed by a contained use activity involving GM plant 
viruses, modified from the UK SACGM Compendium of Guidance Part 4 (HSE 2004). The biosafety level and containment 
measures selected for the activity must be sufficient to reduce the risk to low or effectively zero.  
 
 Likelihood of Hazard 
High Medium Low Negligible 
C
o
n
se
q
u
e
n
ce
 o
f 
H
az
ar
d
 
Severe High High Medium Effectively 
Zero 
Modest High Medium Medium/Low Effectively 
zero 
Minor Medium/low Low Low Effectively 
Zero 
Negligible Effectively 
Zero 
Effectively 
Zero 
Effectively 
Zero 
Effectively 
Zero 
      
 
 
Figure Legend 
Figure 1. Representative schematic of a containment facility for research involving plant 
virus infectious clones. Note that specific requirements are determined by individual risk 
assessments; not every measure will be required or appropriate for a specific virus or use.  
